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"Europe has been the constant theater of surprising characters, actions, revolutions, 
more important events and more complicated circumstances than any that the 
world has ever known. And, perhaps, there never was before a period abounding 
with more surprising actions and events, than that in which we live" 
(John Adams to Jonathan Swall, February 1760). 
John Adam's description of Europe is as apt today as it was 235 years ago. In 
1992, Europe has set the stage for one of the most anticipated economic events of 
the decade: the final unification of the European Economic Community into a 
single common market, often referred as the EC. As time goes by, Europe has 
made progress toward unification, but much remains to be done. One of the most 
important and potentially most difficult aspects of achieving the goal is monetary 
unification. 
The changeover for the national currencies to the European Currency Unit (ECU) 
represents a challenge of historical proportions surpassing everything so far done 
in monetary integration. Facing such important stakes, worries and questioning 
arise concerning the worth of the risk, the time table, the planning and the 
implementation of such a changeover. The main question remains: is the transition 
of national currencies into a single currency under the conditions of the Maastricht 
Treaty realistic? 
Opponents raised questions primarily technical related to the search for a 
way to link the economies of the member states that have different rates of 
inflation, living standards, deficits, and interest rates, without exacerbating, instead 
of resolving, economic hardships. (Bourguinal 1992). For instance, if 
inappropriate internal exchange rates are selected and locked into by the adoption 
of a single currency, regional economic problems could be aggravated. 
"Preconditions for establishing the common currency would include a greatly 
strengthened global financial institution, a truly international legislative 
organization, and a level of international cooperation higher than in the Nineties" 
says Ralph. C. Bryant, an economist at Brookings Institution. 
Although free marketers agree that such enforced restructuring is a necessary 
-even it is painful- step in forging a "leaner economy to compete on the world 
market", others disagree, and point out the experience of countries such as Italy, 
where the adoption of a single currency (albeit over a century ago) has contributed 
to a widening of the disparities between rich and poor regions, which then 
encourage workers migration to richer areas, and led to the emergence of racial 
violence and ethnic tensions. 
Worries also concern the loss of monetary sovereignty and the loss of budgetary 
autonomy. The Delors Plan advocated that each member of the EC would have to 
accept upper limits on its budget deficit. National central banks will no longer 
have the power to avoid formal default by printing more currency. Every centime 
that they spend will have to come from taxation or borrowing, and their ability to 
borrow will be limited by their ability to get to the means to repay. In addition, for 
the commitment to fixed exchange rates to be credible to the financial markets, 
each member of the EC would have to sacrifice a considerable degree of 
sovereignty over its ability to conduct independent fiscal and monetary policies; 
and some European sates, like the United Kingdom, are strongly reluctant to do so. 
Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of Britain, said that "it is to give up 
for all time the rights of the Bank of England and Scotland and our treasury to 
issue our own currency, backed by our own policy, answerable to our own 
Parliament" (Giddy 1994, 10 1). 
Others, finally, point out the level and the influence of the communication's 
technology. It has propelled the world toward global economic interdependence, 
by allowing for worldwide instant currency transactions, and has made managing 
and manipulating the world's many money systems increasingly easier. (Hoffman 
1991). In a world where we can beat French fiancs into German marks and 
German marks into Italian lira by issuing a simple command through the phone or 
the modem, does the EC really need a common currency? 
A majority of the economists and other persons involved in the European 
Monetary Union's process believe that Europe is playing its last chance to resist to 
US and Japanese pressures and to constitute in the whole economy a third giant 
necessary to the whole balance. A French-German monetary union and a French- 
British military defense would give time to Europe to get organized in order to 
resist the US and Japanese attacks. Then, armed and protected, a young and strong 
European Republic could be born. (Faugere 1992). 
Not only a single European currency has a symbolic importance in a growing 
community which is becoming increasingly attractive to more and more countries, 
but proponents also believe it would produce at least three positive effects: lower 
transaction costs because of the reduced uncertainty about exchange rate changes 
among the members of the EC; lower interest rates because of the elimination of 
the bid-ask spread in exchange rates; and enhanced usefulness of money as a mean 
for transmitting information across different national markets. These effects 
would encourage small businesses that lack expertise in dealing with fluctuating 
exchange rates to enter international markets; increase investment and job creation 
by cushioning businesses and nations against the uncertainties caused by 
unpredictable exchange rates; and eliminate fees paid by consumers and businesses 
whenever currency is converted, consequently promoting worldwide trade. 
(Hoffman 1991). 
Undeterred, EMU enthusiasts also argue that the financial markets' "sudden fit of 
nerves" is yet another sign that monetary union is urgently needed. "Without a 
single currency, they claimed that violent movements in European exchange rates - 
without narrow bands is no answer, because the market can easily outgun central 
banks" (The Economist 1995, 36). Not until monetary union has been achieved 
can the internal market produce its full effects. 
As the relevant personalities point it out, it seems obvious that EC 92 would make 
no sense if a reinforcement of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the 
implementation of the European Currency Unit (ECU) with a European Central 
Bank (ECB) to manage the system, would not occur. 
A monetary union has been the EC's long-standing ambition. Beyond the 
traditional economic pluses associated with lowering trade barriers and with 
standardization that accompany formation of a common trading block, Europe 
thinks that a monetary union would enhance the efficiency of capital flows and 
provide a stable monetary environment throughout the EC. This environment, in 
combination with removal of other restrictions, should foster increased investment 
flows. However, despite this long-standing ambition, Western Europe's first 
success in pursuit of the goal did not come until 1979, when it established the 
current European Monetary System (EMS) and a system of stable but flexible 
exchange rates called the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
Based on the decision of the 1969 Hague Summit, the Council of Ministers 
adopted the Werner Plan (named after the former Luxembourg Prime Minister) on 
March 22, 1971 for the progressive creation of an economic and monetary union. 
In 1969, the six members of the EEC, as it was then called, formed a quasi-fixed 
exchange-rate system named the "snake in the tunnel". "This system allowed for a 
margin of fluctuation of 2.25% around currency parity levels among the members' 
currencies, which in turn would move in a US dollar tunnel of 4.5%" (Drach, Perin 
1992, 133). The UK and Ireland quickly left the snake arrangement. France left as 
well, but after a somewhat longer stay. These countries were unwilling to 
coordinate their economy policies with these of the other members of the 
community, in particular West Germany, whose currency was becoming the "de 
facto numeraire" in the system. As well, they were unwilling to bear the sole 
burden of the necessary adjustments that were placed on countries experiencing a 
balance of payment deficit. "The UK, for example, lost approximately 30% of its 
internal reserves within a two-months period in 1972 as a result of an attempt by 
the Bank of England to maintain the value of the pound". With the floating of the 
US dollar in July 1972, the tunnel was immediately dropped. 
After the snake failure, due to inflexibility and weaknesses, the EMS was formally 
inaugurated in March 1979 for the purpose of creating "a zone of monetary 
stability in Europe". The EMS was seen as a catalyst for increased integration of 
the European economies and the creation of a single currency zone to rival the 
American dollar and the Japanese yen in international markets. (Drache, Perin). It 
consisted of the nine nations than then comprised the European Community : 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Grand- 
Britain, and West Germany. Three additional countries then became members: 
Greece (which became EC member on January 1,198 1, and joined the EMS the 10 
June 1985) and Spain and Portugal (which became EC members on January 1, 
1986, and joined the EMS the 16 July 1989). Although Sweden, Finland, and 
Austria became EC members on January 1, 1995, they are not part of the EMS yet. 
(The Economist 1993). 
Along with the EMS was created the ECU. The ECU's composition, and 
thus its value, were identical to those of the European Unit of Account (EUA), 
which had been used in the EEC's accounts since 1975. Following adoption of the 
ECU in the EMS ftamework, the ECU replaced the EUA in all EEC use, effective 
January 1, 198 1. (Giddy 1994). The term "ECU" is derived fiom a French coin 
which was in circulation as far back as the thirteen century, and was defined by the 
Council Regulation of December 18, 1978, as "the sum of specified amounts of the 
currencies of the member states." More precisely, this "basket-type currency" is 
"the Community's budget and accounting unit, created by member states 
depositing 20% of their gold and US dollar reserves with the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF)" (Jacquet 1989). In exchange for their deposit, each 
member receives a credit denominated in ECUs, proportional to the size of the 
economy of the country. The following table shows the composition of the ECU 
basket in terms of percentage and in terms of the currencies of the member states. 
Composition of ECU sum of currencies 
German mark 
French franc 
English pound 
Italian lira 
Dutch guilder 
Belgium fianc 
Spanish peseta 
Danish krone 
Irish punt 
Portuguese escudo 
Greek Drachma 
Luxembourg fianc 
source: European Commission January 20, 1995. 
The 1978 Council Resolution requires that the relative weights of the 
component currencies of the ECU be examined every five years and, if necessary, 
the specified amounts of the component currencies be revised. In addition, any 
member state may request a reexamination if the weight of a currency in the ECU 
has changed at least 25% since the previous revision. In either event, a revision 
can occur only by unanimous decision of the Council. 
Since 1978, the specified amounts of the currencies that make up the ECU have 
changed twice. First, in September 1984, to incorporate the Greek drachma as 
required by the treaty of accession of Greece to the EEC and their other European 
communities; to decrease the amounts of German marks and Dutch guilders 
included in the ECU, and to increase the amounts of Italian lira and French fiancs; 
and secondly in 1989. The entrance of Austria, Sweden and Finland in the bloc on 
January 1, 1995, prompted some speculation that the composition of the ECU and 
the currency weightings within it may be changed; but article 109g flatly rules out 
any change until the start of stage three of Economic and Monetary union and the 
creation of a single EU currency. "The only way it could be changed is through a 
change of the treaty, but it is a very long process and has to be agreed by 
unanimity" (European Commission 1994). 
The ECU plays a vital role in the EMS, in which the central banks of the 
participating member states support the exchange rates of each other's currencies. 
At the heart of the EMS is a joint floating exchange rate arrangement called the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), involving eleven of the current fiReen EC 
members (Greece, Sweden, Finland, and Austria are not presently members). The 
arrangement is intended to constrain exchange rate movement among European 
currencies. It is known as the parity grid rule that says that "each currency is 
supposed to remain fixed against each other currency, within limits" (Giddy 1994, 
98). In this context, the ECU is used as "a reference point for the calculation of 
these parities, as a denominator for the claims and liabilities among the 
participating central banks and as a reserve and settlement instrument created 1 
against gold and dollar deposits by those banks" (Giddy 1994, 112). The ECU is 
the basis for a measure that provides an early warning of the need for a country's 
monetary authorities to take steps unilaterally to stabilize its currency. This 
measure, "the divergence indicator", helps identify strains within the exchange rate 
mechanism caused by that currency's appreciation or depreciation at a rate faster 
than that of others in the ERM. The extent to which the individual currency has 
moved from its central rate against the ECU, relative to its allowed divergence, is 
regarded as an indicator of how badly the country is deviating from the weighted 
average of the others. (Rigoureau 1993). 
During the European trading day, the participating monetary authorities stand 
ready to buy or sell unlimited amounts of their home currency in order to keep it 
within a 2.25% fluctuation margin against the other currencies. Before 1989, out 
of eight integrated currencies, the Italian lira was the only one that was allowed 
6% bands. ARer 1990, UK entered the ERM and the pound was given 6% bands, 
like the Spanish peseta, whereas the lira returned to the regular bands of 2.25%. If 
a country's currency moves beyond 75% of the 2.25% fluctuation margin (or 
1.6875) against its ECU central rate (adjusted for the currency's own weight in the 
ECU), its central bank must either take steps to bring the currency into line or 
explain to the other members why no corrective actions are appropriate because - 
with the exception of Greece which is not members of the ERM- "no member may 
allow its currency to rise more than 2.25% (or 6%) above its central parity rate 
against the weakest currency in the band, nor fall more than 2.25% below its 
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central parity rate against the strongest currency in the band, without intervening in 
the currency market" (Giddy 1994,98). 
Apart fiom intervention, other steps a nation might take include adjusting interest 
rates or taking other economic measures aimed at eliminating the conditions which 
led to the currency movement The hope is that such actions, if taken in a sufficient 
timely manner, will forestall the need for a realignment and further the cause of 
policy coordination. 
If one -or more currencies- is under too much pressure, the member 
countries may agree to undertake a realignment and set new parities and therefore 
a new parity grid, that are regarded as more realistic. Realignments have to be 
agreed to by all ERM member countries, with final decisions being taken by the 
finance ministers and central bank governors. "In the interest of stability, 
realignments are agreed to only reluctantly; when they do occur, they must be of 
sufficient magnitude to remove pressure, but not so great as to distort competitive 
relations among member states" (Giddy 1994, 98). A more extreme measure is to 
suspend the currency's participation in the ERM, as the English pound sterling and 
the Italian lira did following a crisis in the ERM in September 1992. 
Such a crisis was caused by the divergence of economic policies. "These 
differences in policies, as well as changes in trade and investment patterns and the 
comparative strength of each nation's economy, cause the rate of exchange, or 
price of one currency in terms of another, to change more or less constantly" 
(Schilling 1992, 2). "As countries pursue different policies, the fixed rates of 
exchange foundered because they no longer represented true values as established 
in the marketplace" (Schilling 1992, 2). Divergence of monetary and growth 
policies in mid-92 led to a partial breakup of the ERM, one that centered around 
the German central bank's unwillingness to compromise its anti-inflationary 
stance. Later in 1992, the following Christmas Carol was making the rounds of 
London's dealing rooms: 
"God make ye merry, Bundesbank, 
You cause so much dismay; 
Why don't you give us all a break 
And cut your rates today? 
To save the troubled ERM 
And keep the slump away, 
All because of Frankfurt and Bonn 
Our industry's gone- 
All because of Frankfurt and Bonn" 
(Giddy 1994, 100) 
The French might have cried a similar lament in the summer 1993 when German 
anti-inflationary credit policies, coupled with recessionary conditions in France, 
led speculators to short the French fianc and other currencies in the belief that 
current parities were unattainable. After spending a reported $35 billion to defend 
the EMS parities, Europe's central bank governors met to resolve the crisis and 
decided to widen to 15% the intervention bands for all but the mark and the 
guilder, the two strongest currencies. (Financial Technology International Bulletin 
1994). Under the ERM, the more fixed exchange rate system should enable I 
member countries to plan internationally activity with more certainty. However, 
ERM can only work if the nations pursue coordinated monetary policies. 
Such chaos in the ERM, and previous failures to fix exchange rates, such as the 
Bretton Woods Agreement of 1947, fueled the movement toward a common 
monetary policy and common currency within the EC. With the ERM in place, the 
members of the EC in 1986 ratified the Single European Act, which set down a 
number of objectives including the ambitious goal of establishing a single 
European trade zone by the end of 1992. It soon became clear that establishing a 
single market by that date was difficult under the arrangements at that time. / 
Therefore, the EC established a committee, chaired, at that time, by Jacques Delors 
to study the remaining obstacles. 
In June 1988, the European Council appointed the Delors Committee to 
devise a new plan for an economic and monetary union. Its report, known as the 
Delors Plan and submitted in April 1989, proposed a three stages approach to 
accelerate the process, because it was believed that achieving monetary unification 
will help minimize the problems inherent in establishing a common trade zone. 
The Plan also "addressed the need for regional policy to prevent economic 
mismanagement, set constraints on the size of national budget deficits, and 
established the whole movement as a single process" (Schilling 1992, 3). All of 
this was done within the context of monetary unification and the development of a 
new European Central Bank and with a time table designed to bring it about by 
1999 in the third and final stage. As Tim Schilling pointed it out, the Delors Plan 
can be compared with the three stages of a rocket. "The first stage, the main 
booster, provides impetus and makes the launch successful. The second stage sets 
the proper course and establishes the proper orbit. The final stage is the mission 
control, providing for ongoing direction and keeping the prospect from crashing to 
the ground" (Schilling 1992,4). 
The Delors Plan's first stage (1990-1993) consists of continued movement 
toward the basic objectives of EC 1992. It includes the m h e r  convergence of 
trade; rules to establish more uniform standards and prices, and to regulate 
production of goods and services; and a framework to further develop the weaker 
member nations by building infrastructure and to encourage investment 
diversification. It also involves strengthening economic coordination, bringing all 
EC members' currencies into exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System, and lifting restrictions on internal EC capital flows. (European 1991). 
Stage two (1994-1996) is a transitional period which involves increased 
economic convergence (in terms of inflation, fiscal policy, interest rates and 
exchange rate stability) and creation of a transitional European monetary authority. 
Despite the opposition from the German Central Bank, the Bundesbank, and from 
the British government, a politically, functionally and personally independent bank 
was seen as being the best assurance to achieve the monetary goal of safeguarding 
price stability. 
Named the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the unified central bank is often 
referred to, both in Europe and in the US, as Eurofed. The Eurofed's primary legal 
basis is Article 109g of the Maastricht Treaty and the protocol on the Statue of the 
EMI that is annexed to it. (Barnard 1994). The EM1 will be located in Frankfurt 
but, for the time being, many of its activities will be conducted from Basle, the 
home of the main institution to which the EMI is successor, the Committee of EC 
Central Bank Governors. The Treaty charges the EMI with: strengthening the 
cooperation among the national central banks; strengthening the coordination of 
monetary policies with the aim of ensuring price stability; monitoring the 
functioning of the European Monetary System; preparing for the third stage of 
EMU; holding consultations on issues falling within the competence of central 
banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and markets; taking over I 
the tasks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund; and facilitating the use of 
the ECU and overseeing its development. While fulfilling these duties, Eurofed 
would retain political, administrative and economic independence from the 
national and community legislatures. (BEQ 1994). The existing central banks of 
the member nations are to be Eurofed's functioning arm. The leaders of each of 
the national central banks will participate in the coordination of a common 
monetary policy. Within their national boundaries, the national central banks will 
be responsible for implementing the common policy, as well as for bank regulation 
and supervision, and the provision of financial services. In this way, the national 
central banks are similar to the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks in the 
United States, a resemblance that will grow stronger as the Eurofed becomes more 
centralized in the Plan's third stage. (Goodhart 1993). 
A first opportunity to set a date for the transition to stage three will come in 
1996. By the end of that year, the heads of state and government will establish, by 
qualified majority voting, whether a majority of the member states fulfills the 
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economic criteria for the adoption of a single currency, and whether it is 
appropriate for the EC to enter the third stage. If so, a date will be set for the 
beginning of stage three, exchange rate will be irrevocably fixed, monetary powers 
will be transferred from national central banks to a European Central Bank, and a 
single currency will be created. 
Countries that do not meet the criteria would obtain an exemption from the treaty 
and may join later as they are judged to fulfill the economic conditions. Countries L 
with an exemption will not be represented in the policy making bodies of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). If most countries do not fulfill the economic 
criteria by the end of 1997, stage three will automatically begin on January 1, 
1999. This means that those that meet the economic conditions will be permitted 
to form a monetary union, while other countries will obtain a derogation. This 
provision applies to all countries with the exception of the United Kingdom, which 
was reluctant to form a monetary union by creating new EC institutions. To avoid 
a veto on the entire treaty, a compromise was reached allowing the UK and 
Denmark to decide, even if they fulfill the necessary criteria, to participate or not, 
and when they want in the economic and monetary union. 
The pace of the European financial integration process greatly influences 
the growth and the role of the ECU on private markets. Over the past ten years, a 
private ECU market has grown up alongside the official ECU market in a 
considerable manner. 
Activity in the European Currency Unit market started to pick up in the late 1980s 
when borrowers and investors began to entertain the idea that the ECU could 
become Europe's single currency. Although there is not yet a central bank which 
issues ECU bank notes, the ECU is increasingly recognized in the international 
financial markets as a fieely convertible currency. (Lanchner 1993). It is used 
within the European banking system, for denominating international debt and for 
other commercial transactions. "It is used as a currency for loans, for interbank 
lending and lending to individuals, for settlements between multinational 
companies and in foreign trade, as well as occasionally, albeit on a limited scale, 
for cheque transactions or savings accounts" (European Commission 1994). "To 
facilitate the growth of the ECU for private commercial transactions, certain 
European banks have also established a clearing mechanism for the ECU, thus 
enabling the transfer of the ECU without necessarily having to make separate 
transactions in each of the component currencies" (Morgan 1993,3). 
There has also been an array of innovative financial products created to fiuther 
enhance the use of the ECU. These products include European currency unit 
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denominated deposits, loans, swaps, bonds, futures, options and numerous 
variations of these themes. Many financial institutions, primarily in the Benelux 
countries, Britain, France, Denmark and Italy, make both spot and forward markets 
in the ECU against the US dollar and other currencies. 
These exchange rate are published in most European daily financial publications 
and through several new services. There have also been institutions that have 
come into existence such as the Mutual European Currency Unit Settlement 
Association for clearing transactions. (Lowry 1993,22). 
The ECU's most important function is as a currency for denominating loans 
and for interbank monetary transactions. On the international bond market it is 
now one of the top five currencies, joining the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the 
German mark and the English pound. The total amount of ECU bond issues 
launched in 1994 is ECU 20.508 billion including Greek ECU linked bonds. Two 
EC institutions, the Commission and the European Investment Bank, have played a 
major role in this connection by denominating their own loans in ECUs. 
(European Commission). Investors and borrowers in Japan and the United States 
have also come to appreciate the ECU. It is no longer an European currency; it has 
become an international one. 
The ECU is attractive for investors because it represents a low transaction cost, it 
is easy to use, and stable. An investigation conducted in 1994 of the risk-return 
parameters of the ECU compared to that of minimum-variance, homemade 
currency baskets, suggested that the "ECU is dominated by in-sample minimum- 
variance baskets, but compared favorably with low-risk, out-of-sample currency 
baskets" (Johnson 1994, 51). 
Because it is a basket-type currency, the ECU is an average and thus evens out the 
fluctuations affecting individual currencies and reflected in exchange rates and 
interest rates. After declining by 2% in September 1992 because of the Danish 
rejection of the Maastricht treaty in June, the ECU has returned to investor favor. 
If the currency's value continues its recovery, as it might well do if sterling and 
perhaps the lira regain some of their value, the ECU's best use might be as a 
borrowing medium, so as to have debts in it to finance non-interest-bearing 
receivable. (Lanchner 1993). 
Despite the distinction made between the official use of the ECU by the central 
banks participating in the EMS and its use on private markets, a link exists in the 
shape of the common definition. And these two areas will increasingly merge 
together as member states' governments become more committed to promoting 
private use of the ECU, and as the goal of achieving EMU in full, gains in 
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credibility, and comes closer to realization. 
The agreement on EMU may come to be seen as a major event in the 
economic history of Europe. An European monetary constitution with the goal of 
price stability would not only shape the economic fortunes of the EC member 
states, but would also exercise a worldwide influence. It is likely to serve as an 
economic policy guidepost for the emerging market economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe which expect to tie themselves more closely to the EC. 
However, whereas the Maastricht Treaty anticipates positive consequences, the 
EMU'S creation and application is a very complex task, both technically and 
politically, that requires a high degree of convergence of economic policies and 
performance. Although the deadline is fixed in four years fiom now, in 1999, such 
conditions cannot be accomplished fiom a day to another, and the European 
authorities already seem to be behind schedule. 
Slowly but surely, the building blocks of EMU are falling into place. 
Despite major oppositions, the chances of a joint European currency are, in fact, 
better than ever. Preparations for introducing the ECU outlined in the Maastricht 
Treaty are proceeding 111 speed ahead. 
In Frankfbrt, a working group is designing new ECU notes. Various European 
Union ministers of finance, who are in charge of the new currency, have directed 
their mints to create the new coins and bills and set up plans for exchanging them 
for existing currencies" (World Press Review 1994, 37). The ministers of finance 
plan to introduce three bicoloured coins of: one ECU, half of an ECU, and two 
ECUS. The two ECU coin would have a 27 minimeter diameter, with an external 
gold ring and a silver core. This model, like the 10 French fianc coin or the 500 
lira coin is supposed to make counterfeiting more difficult. The one ECU coin 
would have opposite color, and the half of ECU coin would be totally silver. As 
for the symbol which will figure on the European Currency Unit, no 
recommendation was yet formulated. (La Presse 1995). 
"On November 15, 1994, the European Monetary Institute (EM), the European 
Union's Central Bank-in-waiting, moved into its new premises in FrankW' (The 
Economist 1994, 91). Its most important job is to encourage economic 
convergence among the EU's member states, but it is also responsible for forging a 
common payment system and promoting the use of the ECU, "These tasks may 
seem mundane, but attention to detail is crucial now that EMU is climbing back up 
Western Europe's political agenda" (The Economist 1994,91). 
The Delors Plan fixed two dates for the achievement of the EMU. The earliest is 
1997 and the deadline is 1999. The European Commission thinks that with a little 
bit of extra effort, the move to stage three of EMU in 1997 has become a realistic 
proposition due to the emerging economic recovery. In order for stage three to 
begin in 1997, a majority of the EEC countries must meet the requirements on 
debts, inflation, interest rates, and currency stability by the end of 1996. The EC 
encourages this possibility in its Annual report for 1995, stating that "if additional 
efforts are made along the lines agreed in the Broad Economic Policy Guideline of 
1993 and 1994, there is a realistic chance of achieving the goal of having a 
majority of member states fulfilling the convergence criteria by 1996-97". 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, a country applying for EMU should meet the 
five following conditions: the country should have stable exchange rate (respecting 
the ERM's fluctuation bands) for at least two years forehand; its long-term interest 
rates should be within two percentage points of the average of the best three 
performers; its inflation rate should be within one and an half point of the average 
of the best three performers; its government deficit should be limited to 3% of 
Gross National Product (GDP); and its public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. 
(The Economist 1995). 
In October 1994, the Commission ruled that only Luxembourg and Ireland met the 
criteria so far. Having taking advantage of escape clauses to bail out of the 
currency union, Britain and Denmark will not vote when the poll is conducted in 
1996. However -and according to the European Commission- seven countries: 
Belgium, France, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain 
could make up the majority necessary to adopt the ECU. The European 
Commission pressed for a statement on the wide 15% fluctuation bands (which 
replace the 2.25% bands after the ERM crisis in 1992-93), to keep hopes alive that 
the 1997 date for EMU could be met. "So far, the wider bands have prevented 
large exchange rate depreciation and excessive intervention with potentially 
inflationary consequences", Mr Theo Waigel, the German finance minister said. 
(Barber 1994, 16). Therefore, in the light of this experience and in the current 
circumstances, the EM1 council considered it advisable to maintain the present 
arrangements. However, Mr. Waigel refused to say whether the 15% bands would 
continue until a decision is made on whether to move to a single currency, or 
whether ministers would support a progressive narrowing of the bands. Jacques 
Santer, the incoming European Commission president, told the daily El Pais he 
would work to achieve the third phase of monetary union in 1997, as laid down in 
the treaty of Maastricht, arguing that it was important not to weaken the provisions 
of the Treaty. "If we do not make it by then, there is still 1999. By then, we all / 
# have to get there. This is essential. If by the end of the century, we have not 
achieve the single currency, we will have failed", he said. (European Commission 
1994). However, and despite the efforts already made for the process, the 
probability of achieving EMU by 1997 is very low. 
The ECU is on this way, but many things remain to be done before it can be 
introduced as a single currency. At the European Commission in Brussels, 
Economics Commissioner Henning Christophersen has set up a group of 
technicians to deal with problems of banks, stores, insurance companies, and 
vending-machine owners. The recalculation of loans and investments, the /' 
reevaluation of commercial paper, the reprogramming of software in cash 
machines have also to be taking care of before the introduction of the ECU. The 
transition to a single European currency will be fraught with technical and 
implementation difficulties which appear to have been almost ignored by people 
like the French president, Francois Mitterand, who, in an address to the European 
parliament on January 17, 1995, talked about the possibility of Economic and 
Monetary Union as early as 1997. 
For other people, like Alexandre Lamfalussy, head of the European Monetary 
institute, the wait-to-be Europe's central bank, such a speedy transition is hardly 
likely. Hans Tietmeyer, the president of the German Bundesbank, agrees and has 
repeated his doubts about seeing a single currency introduced before the end of the 
century. In an interview he gave the German daily "Suddeutsche Zeitung", Hans 
Tietmeyer stated his conviction that it would still be possible to pay in marks by 
the year 2000. "Monetary union or no monetary union, national currencies are not 
likely to disappear until well into the next century" (European commission 1994). 
A recent report by the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, chaired by 
Barclays Bank's Malcom Levitt, reports that initial estimates by some of Europe's 
largest banks suggest that the process of reviewing and adapting all relevant 
programs, systems and procedures could take up to five years" (The Banker 1994). 
The commission in charge of defining the shape of the future European currency 
also estimates that it is already "way too late" to devise all the coins if the currency 
had to be introduced in 1997; and most likely, it is already too late for 1999. 
That timetable looked optimistic even during the Maastricht negotiations 
four years ago. In 1992, the pound and the lira were forced out of the exchange- 
rate-mechanism, which almost shattered a year later as the pain of keeping interest 
rates high in the wake of German unification became almost intolerable. Salvation 
was obtained only by widening the bands within which currency were allowed to 
fluctuate. (Humpheys 1993). But even now, the mechanism looks at risk, and this 
time for reasons that are at least political as they are economic. 
While the D-mark has become a safe haven, seemingly unaffected by the strike by 
Germany's largest union, IG Metall, other currencies are weakening with every 
touch of political pressure. The French franc falls as Edouard Balladur, the prime 
minister, slides down the opinion-poll ratings. The peseta tumbles as scandals 
come ever closer to Spain's embattled prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez. The lira is 
being undermined because the government of Lamberto Dini is too weak to 
oversee fundamental economic reform. The pound falls because John Major's 
government is surviving too many crises for comfort. Some supporters of EMU 
argue that minor political squalls do not matter. "They move currency markets 
only because such markets exist. Once EMU does away with the markets, the 
economic consequences of political jitters will disappear too" (The Economist 
1995). But even if that were true, economic problems would remain. 
Although the European Commission believes that seven countries will meet the 
criteria by 1997, Luxembourg is today the only one up to the target. France will 
find it hard to cut its government deficit (expected to be 5% of GDP in 1995) to 
the 3% target laid in the Treaty. From an economic point of view, deficits could 
be lower, but it would reopen the whole discussion if this percentage was explicitly 
changed now. The Maastricht criteria were negotiated in a period of high growth 
and long discussions took place on this percentage, with 3% representing a 
compromise. Even Germany, because of its public debt, might not satis@ all the 
criteria by 1997. The OECD expects The Netherlands and Belgium, both of whose 
currencies are closely linked to the German mark, to have debt ratios of 81.4% and 
134% in 1996. And Italy and Greece are also expected to have public debt 
burdens more than double the Maastricht limits. That means the 1997 target is 
impossible, whatever official protestations expressed by Jacques Santer are, and 
however much work is being done at the European Monetary Institute; and for a 
1999 start, the latest date envisaged by Maastricht, preparation has to start 
immediately. 
Realizing how far the countries are fkom the required level, the question of 
relaxing the conditions arises. France and other countries have argued that criteria 
concerning government deficits and, especially, the ratio of government debt to 
GDP, should be interpreted flexibly. "Even though the government debt of 
countries involved in EMU is supposed to be lower than 60% of their GDP, they 
say that it should be possible to include any country that has a credible plan to hit 
the target" (The Economist 1995,49). Belgium, which already has currency union 
with Luxembourg and does not want to be cut off fiom Holland and Germany, its 
partners in the emerging D-mark block, is relying on a flexible interpretation of the 
Maastricht criteria. That means, in the words of the Treaty, that its government 
deficit will have "declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that 
comes close to the reference value" and that its public debt will be "sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace". (The 
Economist 1995). It is possible, even likely, that Belgium will soon be doing all 
these things, but if concessions are made to Belgium, why not also make them to 
Spain or Portugal? 
Hans Tietmeyer, president of the Bundesbank, is worried about such sloppiness 
and has insisted that no special treatment should occur. He is not willing to 
tolerate looser monetary policy in Germany under EMU than he now runs with the 
D-mark. (Walters 1994). In addition, the Commission clearly stated that there can 
be no negotiation on the criteria. "It would erode the whole EMU process if this 
were otherwise, and nothing should be added or subtracted" (European 
Commission 1994). Special treatment might also penalized concerned countries 
which would probably find their currency singled out for attack. "The growing 
spread between the yields of German government bonds and those of Sweden, 
Spain, and Italy, and the weakness of the lira and peseta, are signs that the markets 
will pounce upon half-hearted attempts at economic reform1' (Thygesen 1994,7). 
The transition to a single currency involves a number of possible scenarios: 
firstly, a "big-bang" where the ECU immediately replaced the national currency or 
means of payment; secondly, a dual-currency approach where the ECU co-exists 
with national currency in the case of some forms of payment; and finally variations 
and combinations of the above: a "big-bang" for inter-banks only, while customers 
may choose which currency to use. 
Three think-tanks -the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe 
(AMUE), whose members include companies and banks, the ECU Banking 
Association, and a study group set up by the European commission under the 
chairmanship of Lees Maas, a director of ING, a Dutch financial services group- 
"all reckon that a 'big-bang' is the best and cheapest solution" (The Economist 
1994,91). However, they also agree that this ideal solution may be too complex to 
work. The expert group stated in its report of January 20, 1995, that "the 
possibility of a 'big-bang', or instantaneous introduction of all the elements that 
will go to make up a single European currency is most unlikely on the first day of 
stage three of EMU, even if this date will be first January 1999" (Expert group 
1994). It is also impossible to remove all national currencies in one day or week- 
end and, indeed, undesirable to do so; this would be too difficult to the public 
because it is a huge operation. (European Commission 1995). Also, because the 
characteristics of future coins and bank notes have not be fully decided yet, "the 
'big-bang' option may be logistically impossible for many years because of the 
logistical issues associated with the replacement of a huge volume of notes and 
coins and the many machines, in several sectors which handle them" (Banker, 
1994). 
The Maastricht Treaty which lays down a time table for EMU, does not insist on a 
"big-bang", but on "the rapid introduction of the ECU as the single currency" after 
the completion of monetary union which could take place between 1997 and 1999. 
In its report, the expert group stated that" the time between the start of monetary 
policy operation in ECU and the physical introduction of ECU notes and coins 
should be as short as possible to reduce the cost by avoiding dual accounting or 
transitional systems, and to reduce the danger of public confusion and the 
associated negative effects on credibility and acceptability of the single currency". 
If the transition were too slow, some of the gains of EMU would take longer to 
realize. Worst, speculators could test commitment to the system by sniping against 
individual currency. 
Memories of the near break-up of Europe's exchange rate mechanism in both 
September 1992 and August 1993 still haunts Europe's policy- makers. 'To 
prevent speculating attacks during a period of parallel currencies, Tommaso Padoa 
Schioppa, a deputy director of Italy central bank, says that the proposed EU central 
bank must have sole control over monetary policy. It must also be ready to 
exchange unlimited amounts of one member currency for another at the fixed 
exchange rate. 
The alternative of a dual-currency transition requires the duplication of 
payment processing, accounting, settlement and cash holding and possibly dual 
pricing in shops although it provides a gradual familiarization period. This would 
consequently increase the cost of the changeover. "AMUE reckons that a large 
European bank would have to fork out some 100 million to 150 million ECUS 
($120 million to $185 million) over five years to rejig its computer system, retrain 
staff and prepare for new notes and coins before a 'big-bang' transition" (The 
Economist 1994,91). A parallel currency system could increase that cost by 50%; 
and heavy burden would fall on small firms and shopkeepers, who would need 
dual accounting system. 
The solution seems therefore to be a compromise between the "big-bang" 
and dual currency. In preliminary report to the European Commission, Mr. Maas' 
group suggests a brief six months transition period between the start of EMZT and 
the introduction of the ECU. The ECU Banking Association also prefers an 
intermediate way between the "big-bang" and the parallel currency approach. 
The AMUE envisages variety of scenarios, including one involving a "big-bang" 
for non-cash transactions -electronic payments, checks and the like- with a 
transition period for notes and coins. The commission proposed a two period plan. 
In stage IIIa, the ECB would begin to operate monetary policy in ECU, and 
internal accounting systems of banks will therefore have to be redenominated into 
ECU. This already is a kind of 'big-bang" because the locking of exchange rate 
between currencies meeting the economic conversion criteria would be done 
overnight; and an exchange rate mechanism would continue to exist for those EU 
countries not participating and dominated by a heavy anchor, the ECU. 
Stage IIIb will be the period of co-existence of national currencies and the ECU. 
Banks and other financial institutions would still use national currency for dealing 
with individual customers but ECU for transactions on the financial market. This 
should be as short as possible (no more than six months), although long enough to 
allow people to become accustomed to the ECU. The older currencies will then be 
changed for new bank notes and coins, and the old ones will be melted or 
destroyed. (The European Commission). 
Phasing in the third stage would have the advantage of offering the requisite 
monetary stability while allowing citizens some time to get used to the single 
currency. Similarly, the banks, which are extremely concerned about the practical 
difficulties involved in the third stage, would be reassured by this formula, that 
obviously supposes that the individual EU currencies would be made legal tender 
in all other countries of the union in the early stages. 
The changeover for national currencies to the single currency represents a 
challenge of historical proportions surpassing everything so far done in monetary 
integration. Unfortunately, there are few precedent situations to draw on. 
British decimalisation in 1971 and German monetary unification in 1990 provide 
some important lessons. One is the importance of advanced planning. The British 
government announced its intention to decimalise five years before it did so, and 
set the precise state at which the switch will take place three years in advance. 
Public authorities and the private sector should start an on-going dialogue on the 
timing of the physical introduction of these new European monetary units and the 
point at which the European central bank will start using this new unit for 
monetary policy purposes to prepare people's minds to the changeover. 
Decimalisation also highlighted the importance of educating people about a new 
currency. "Before the change, every British household got a booklet with 
conversation tables f?om the state; children were taught about decimalisation in 
schools and banks issued a joint guide to their customers" (The Economist 1994, 
91). Because the key tests for the success of the introduction of the single 
currency will be its acceptance by ordinary citizens as the natural currency for 
Europeans, a substantial program of education and explanation, touching every 
citizen of the monetary union will be required as soon as it is decided which 
countries will move ahead to stage three. The planning of such a campaign may 
even have to start earlier. 
This new currency unit will become the European union expression of 
economic progress, of price stability, and its successful integration and 
management will rank amongst the union's greatest achievements. But a change of 
this magnitude must have full support of citizens and businesses in participating 
states; and right now, the objective is far flom being reached. 
Public opinion in the main European economies of France, Germany and 
the UK remains divided. According to an opinion poll carried out for the Financial 
Times, support for political and monetary union in Europe is even lower among 
Germans than Britons. "Nearly two-thirds of adults in each of the two countries 
want a referendum on a single European currency" (Marsh 1994, 2). "Only 33% 
of Britons and 24% of Germans support a single currency, while 27% of British 
voters and just 23% of Germans say they favor closer political links among 
European Union members" (Marsh 1994, 2). A total of 28% of British 
respondents said their region has suffered as a result of EU membership, against 
14% who say it has benefited. The equivalent in Germany are 15% and 17% 
respectively. German chancellor Helmut Kohl (in this election year) knows how 
his people feel, which is why he has been saying little about the ECU. Strong 
opposition in Germany to the single currency is caused above all by Germans' 
anxieties that a future European money might be less stable than the mark. "There 
will be no ECU until the pan-European currency is as solid as German's own", 
Kohl said. (World Press Review 1994). After having consulted 1,9 19 respondents 
in the UK and 2,455 in German, the poll and most comprehensive survey ever 
made of British and German attitudes to European integration, demonstrated that 
64% of Britons and 65% of Germans favored a referendum on whether the EU 
should adopt a single currency. Commenting on this alternative, Jacques Santer, 
the Luxembourg prime minister and president designate of the European 
Commission, pointed out the legal complexity of holding referendums on a single 
currency and the fact that the Maastricht Treaty had already been ratified. What 
would happen if the people said "no"? 
Persuading European to part with their national currency will be a hard task. 
"While Germans need to be convinced that the ECU will be at least as strong as 
the German mark, folk in weak currency countries must be reassured that the 
switch to the ECU does not involve a hidden devaluation of their currency" (The 
Economist 1994, 91). However, it was felt that non participating currency will be 
at a disadvantage, being perceived as weaker currencies whereas the ECU is 
designed to be perceived as strong. This perception may affect the behavior of 
investor in all countries. There may be a greater reluctance, even on the part of 
residents in those non-participating currency. In addition, the business community 
in non-participating countries may well shift towards using the ECU as its 
currency for international transactions. 
In 1999, according to the Treaty, a majority will no longer be needed for the 
introduction of the ECU. By then, every nation that has filfilled the required 
criteria must begin using the currency. Though it might be very unpopular to do 
so, Germany's politicians will have to come to terms with the end of the mark. 
"There is no longer any way to get out or go back. Bonn would have to break the 
treaty to do so, and that would be the end of the EU" (WPR 1994,37). 
As they will experience not inconsiderable change in their daily activities 
and bear an inevitable expense, they must therefore be convinced that the 
changeover will be successful because it has been well planned, balancing ease of 
change with minimal costs. 
There is a clear-cut need for the private sector to be adequately prepared for its 
ramifications, so it is therefore of vital importance for awareness to be raised 
amongst consumers, using effective information campaigns including eliminating 
conversion costs and making cross-border price comparisons easier. The 
European Commission already planned face to face meetings during the French 
presidency with consumers, relevant businesses and relevant organizations in order 
to gain the support of the general public. 
There should be as well a close cooperation between the European and national 
authorities, not only with one another, but also with all economic agents in the 
private sector, such as banks, manufacturers, retailers, everyone handling large 
volumes of money such as transport and telephone authority and with the 
executive functions of government such as taxation and social security 
administration. 
The introduction of the single currency cannot be implemented by public 
authorities without the early participation of everyone involved in making, 
receiving, processing, accounting, and finally settling payments, in particular 
banks, companies in every sector of economic life, and the general public. 
But at present, only few banks or companies have given sane thoughts to 
the changes they need to implement, and those which have begun to study this far 
are unclear about the time table and precise scenario they face. This implicates the 
risk that different companies and sectors may plan for the stage three on the basis 
of different and even contradictory assumptions which could therefore produce 
chaos. Unless the private sector is certain about the precise deadline of the 
introduction of the single currency and the scenario it faces, companies will be 
reluctant to commit the necessary resources, thereby lengthening the gap between 
the start of stage three and the introduction of a single currency. 
For this reason, consultative bodies should be established at European and 
national level drawing together all parties concerned, provided with the necessary 
human and financial resources, to build on the work undertaken in this report, in 
order to identify and plan for the changes which need to be undertaken, especially 
the identification of the most efficient and speedy means of introducing the single 
currency. The creation in May 1994 of an official independent study group by the 
European Commission is already a positive answer to this suggestion. The so- 
called Expert Group, presided by Mr. Maas (executive member of the board of 
ING Group and former chairman of the Monetary Committee), presents the 
practical problems linked to introducing the single currency for the different 
sectors of the economy: industry, commerce and business, the government and 
public sector, the banking and financial sector, and individual consumers. 
To ensure a smooth, efficient and effective introduction of the single currency, a 
solution must be identified and chosen as soon as possible so that planning and 
implementation of the necessary changes can be initiated. Also, clear political 
decisions should be taken and the necessary legislation should be put in place in 
good time so that all concerned have a common understanding of the time table 
and scenarios which they must planned. The late announcement of a long or 
undetermined period of adaptation to the single currency would discourage efforts 
and increase the risk of not finalizing EMU. 
Many issues need to be recognized and studied to prepare immediately and 
ensure the successful implementation of the ECU. Although no precise solution 
has been planned and organized for the changeover yet, the single currency 
remains a priority objective, since the benefits of the change to European cross- 
border trade and economic growth will be permanent. They will be greater than 
the once-for-all cost of the change, while the cost of doing nothing would be much 
higher. But despite its future advantages, the transition fiom national currencies to 
ECU will not be an easy task. 
The European Commission sees the development of the use of the private ECU in 
the period leading up to economic and monetary union as the best way to deal with 
the future challenge of EMU itself. However, two types of legal problems could 
hamper the use of the private ECU. One relates to the nature of the ECU and 
national currency laws, such as the fact that no sovereign state issues ECUS and 
the ECU is not considered a legal tender. And the other one concerns areas outside 
the monetary field, such as laws preventing contracting parties in EC member 
states fiom denominating and paying their undertakings and obligations in ECUS. 
Therefore, in order to obtain a large and spontaneous use of the ECU in the 
transitional phase, additional measures will have to be adopted by the Economic 
European Community and the member states' governments. Some of these 
measures would be to give the ECU a legal status equal or comparable to the one 
that national currencies enjoy; to authorize EEC residents to pay their taxes in 
ECU; and to perform all the Community's operations in ECU, including the 
salaries payments. 
With such measures, the ECU would be gradually accepted and supported as the 
European Currency Unit by the several sectors of the market. This would 
considerably ease the process of changeover, and permit a smooth and successful 
transition to the single currency. In this way, the Economic Monetary Union will 
be completed, and the long-standing ambition of a Single Common Market will be 
finally achieved. 
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currency stability. 
- Lanchner, David, "The ECU's back in favor", Global Finance, March 1993, p: 21 
- Lowry, Amanda, "Private ECU gets promotion", International Corp- Law, May 
1993, pp.: 21-22. 
The official European Currency unit -the ECU- used within the European 
currency system is defined and the private ECU is introduced. The private ECU is 
contained in commercial contracts and, in general, its definition follows that of the i' 
official ECU. The European Commission sees the development of the use of the private 
ECU in the period leading up to economic and monetary union, as the best way to deal 
with the future challenge of EMU itself. 
- Marsh, David, "Poll shows support for vote on E.U. single currency", D&Qiggd, 
December 5, 1994, p:2. 
David Marsh presents the most comprehensive survey ever made of British and 
German attitudes to European integration. The Poll shows that strong opposition to the 
single currency exist in Europe, especially in Germany and in the UK. The possibility of 
a referendum and the consequent reactions of Jacques Santer, the incoming president of 
the European Commission, are discussed. 
- Mason, Joanne, "The ECU gains currency", -, June 1992, 
p: 32. 
- Morgan, Peter, 'A currency that business can use", Director, September 1993, p:3. 
- Schilling, Tom, "Is there a Eurofed in the future?", Federal m e  Bank of Chicavo 
Review. January 21, 1992, pp: 1-7. 
- Schlesinger, Helmut," On the way to a new monetary union: The European Monetary 
Union", Federal Reserve Bank of St. J,ouis Review, May/June,1994, pp3-10. 
- Scott, Andrew, "Developments in the economics of the European Union", Journal of 
Common August 1994, pp.: 87-104. 
- Thygesen, Niel, "Why is economic and monetary union an important objective for 
Europe?, International Review of Law and Economics. June1994, pp:133-145. 
Many U.S and some European observers of the changing fortunes of the efforts to 
achieve an advanced degree of integration in the European Community are puzzled by the 
ambition to create an economic and monetary union in the EC, extending to the 
introduction of a common currency and a European Central Bank (ECB) to run a joint 
monetary policy. Some focus on what they regard as questionable economic of such 
move, while others suggest that EMU can only be justified in political terms. But in the 
latter case, the strategy is seen as very risky because monetary unification would then run 
well ahead of political union, reversing the order of integration in existing large federal 
states. 
- Walters, Alan, "One European currency: the ECU", World Press Review, October 1994, 
pp.: 36-37. 
The reluctance of the Germans to the single currency is discussed. They wony 
that the ECU will not be as strong as the D-mark. The solution of fixing the core 
country's currencies to the D-mark is believed to be the only alternative to convince the 
markets to move towards the final stage of EMU. 
The author believes that a Deutschemark Europe will be present for a long time 
because it would not allow his symbol of its stability and success to be replaced by any 
ECU. 
- The Interim Report of the Independent Expert Group on Practical Questions Raised by 
the Introduction of the ECU as a Single Currency. Brussels, January 20, 1995. 
The Expert Group gives all the basic information concerning the implementation 
of the EMU. It estimates what is to be done to have a smooth transition to the ECU, how 
long it will take, and how much it will cost. Because the group does not want to 
underestimate the provision of the Treaty, it talks about the possibility of seeing a single 
currency by 1997, but it strongly emphasizes the urgent need for preparation. The Expert 
Group also explains how important the public acceptance is. It proposes to organize 
various campaigns in all the various sectors in the market to promote the image of the 
future European currency. 
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Picture this: At the foreign exchange counter at Miami International Airport, you cash in 
dollars for traveler's checks and a pocketful of coins and bills, both denominated in 
European Currency Units, or ecus. With this money, you breakfast on coffee and 
croissants in Paris, purchase stamps and postcards in Rome, and settle your hotel bill in 
Amsterdam. 
Although the ecu has not yet replaced the traditional currencies of the twelve nations of 
the EC, it is not a fantasy. 
Implemented in 1979 by the European Monetary System (EMS), "the ecu is the 
Community's budget and accounting unit, created by member states depositing 20% of 
their gold and US dollar reserves with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund". 
(Bourguinal, 232). For the moment, the ecu is used primarily for financial transactions 
and for keeping accounts among the EC's member countries; but the progressive 
integration of a single market intensifies the need for one European currency that would 
be used throughout the EC - not in addition to, but instead of the national currencies- and 
that would be accepted globally. 
"Easy to say, but not so easy to do"! Having a common currency implies a common 
monetary policy with a central bank to produce and control the money supply. Linking 
the economies of twelve countries that have different rates of inflation, living standards, 
deficits, interest rates, political policies and cultures seems to be unreachable. However, 
the economists who studied the problem believe that it is a necessity for the success of, 
what they call, Europe 92. They argue that a unified monetary system would eliminate 
inefficiency and the expense of exchange transaction, contribute to economic and price 
stability by removing uncertainties about variations in exchange rates, and increase 
Europe's ability to compete against the United States and Japan. 
Other economists also argue that the transition to full European Monetary Union (EMU) 
will be costly. Replacing the twelve -soon to become more- individual currencies with a 
single European currency unit (ECU) will require considerable adjustments by banks and 
an education program for their customers. "The ECU Banking Association report 
highlights both the implications of the changeover and the uncertainties about its timing." 
I,September 1994). 
I picked the subject "ECU" for personal interest. Being a French citizen makes me part of 
the future of Europe. Whether they would be successful or not, the events taking place in 
Europe will influence my own life as well as many others' life. The implementation of 
the ecu as a common currency is planned to happen in the last stage of the European and 
Monetary Union Treaty and will mark the accomplishment of what has been called 
Europe 92. I believe those events are of a great importance, because they will have an 
incredible international impact, not only on the European nations, but also on the rest of 
the world. From the third stage of the EMU could evolve a new superpower with a strong 
currency, which will ultimately restore the balance in the world market. 
This paper will tend to explain the role and the use of the ecu as well as the polemics and 
the consequences of its implementation. It is aimed to any person who wants to do 
business or invest in Europe, so that helshe could forecast the pitfalls and the 
opportunities that such events would provide. 
My sources come primarily from secondary research. In order to have diversified 
opinions and more information, I gathered books and articles from both France and the 
United States. I believe this thesis will greatly improve my knowledge about the 
European Monetary system, as well as it will show me the complexity of the politically, 
financially and economically interrelated world. 
The publishing company that I chose is hr&&micService located in Department 
WM 2101 East street NW Washington DC 20037. It is a monthly magazine for foreign 
services, personal and others interests in foreign affairs and related subjects, and it 
publishes three months after acceptance. 
